Wednesday, July 23. 2008
An argument against Universally Preferable Behavior
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Empericism is based on axiom two and the scientific method is based on Empiricism. It could all be a delusion, but if so, it's a delusion that all rational people share, thus it is still universal.
Hindus and others may indeed reject this axiom, but to the degree they do, they are irrational.
Hindus and others may indeed reject this axiom, but to the degree they do, they are irrational.
"Axiom 3: LANGUAGE HAS THE CAPACITY FOR MEANING. If the author could quit using "better" in his axioms, I might be tempted to agree here. Seriously, this is an open problem in philosophy, but one I'll concede for expediency as well."
Fine. If you concede, then we'll move on.
"Axiom 4: CORRECTION REQUIRES UNIVERSAL PREFERENCES "If you correct me on an error that I have made, you are implicitly accepting the fact that it would be better for me to correct my error. Your preference for me to correct my error is not subjective, but objective, and universal." Essentially, the author is appealing to the reader for agreement. This is dangerous, since all an opponent has to do to reject your entire argument is say "In my belief system, I don't care if you're in error." Also, what is "better"? (I'll raise that again in a second.)"
Are you seriously arguing that you are attempting to correct the error you believe you have found in this axiom for some other reason that that you find it erroneous? If so what is that other reason? Whatever answer you give will weaken or discredit your attempted correction. You prove Stefan's axiom by attempting to disprove it.
Fine. If you concede, then we'll move on.
"Axiom 4: CORRECTION REQUIRES UNIVERSAL PREFERENCES "If you correct me on an error that I have made, you are implicitly accepting the fact that it would be better for me to correct my error. Your preference for me to correct my error is not subjective, but objective, and universal." Essentially, the author is appealing to the reader for agreement. This is dangerous, since all an opponent has to do to reject your entire argument is say "In my belief system, I don't care if you're in error." Also, what is "better"? (I'll raise that again in a second.)"
Are you seriously arguing that you are attempting to correct the error you believe you have found in this axiom for some other reason that that you find it erroneous? If so what is that other reason? Whatever answer you give will weaken or discredit your attempted correction. You prove Stefan's axiom by attempting to disprove it.
"Axion 5: AN OBJECTIVE METHODOLOGY EXISTS FOR SEPARATING TRUTH FROM FALSEHOOD In the end, this is just a restatement of axiom 2, with an addition of the concept of "Truth". To quote Pilate, "Quid est veritas?" Again, I have to accept axiom 5, but much philosophical debate of the last 5 millennia has been about trying to prove 5, and it's still up for debate."
If you have to accept axiom 5, then you accept it, so will move on.
"If good just means preferable, then you're open to "you may prefer truth, but I prefer not to tell the truth sometimes".
untrue. All things being equal, you always prefer to tell the truth. So do I. So does everybody. It's when things aren't otherwise equal that our preferences diverge. This is observedly true. Pathological liars are acting irrationally. That's why it's a pathology and not a preference.
If you have to accept axiom 5, then you accept it, so will move on.
"If good just means preferable, then you're open to "you may prefer truth, but I prefer not to tell the truth sometimes".
untrue. All things being equal, you always prefer to tell the truth. So do I. So does everybody. It's when things aren't otherwise equal that our preferences diverge. This is observedly true. Pathological liars are acting irrationally. That's why it's a pathology and not a preference.
"First, it assumes free will. It is entirely possible for me to posit this argument without free will. My biological computer program, faced with an input set that drives it through a super-complex steady state tree, drives my hands to type out this post. I am no more "responsible" than the first Intel Pentium was "responsible" for rounding errors in the floating point unit."
Is a bacterium inanimate because it is composed of inanimate chemichals? Of course not. Is free will nonexistant because your mind might be a biological computer program, faced with an input set that drives it through a super-complex steady state tree? Of course not. UPB doesn't "assume" free will. It acknowledges free will, free will that is observed the same way the animation of of a bacterium is observed.
You are the one confusing the Pentium with the program it processes, a program that to some small but vitally important degree, writes (or at least alters) itself.
Is a bacterium inanimate because it is composed of inanimate chemichals? Of course not. Is free will nonexistant because your mind might be a biological computer program, faced with an input set that drives it through a super-complex steady state tree? Of course not. UPB doesn't "assume" free will. It acknowledges free will, free will that is observed the same way the animation of of a bacterium is observed.
You are the one confusing the Pentium with the program it processes, a program that to some small but vitally important degree, writes (or at least alters) itself.
